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Abstract 
This paper makes a case for the value of looking at culture and multinationals from a 
management and organizational perspective because it is one which could direct greater 
attention towards culture as a significant factor in future investigation on multinational 
corporations. We attempt to illustrate that multinationals are fundamentally multicultural units 
in more ways than one.  
This paper is based on selected materials from a qualitative study of culture and learning in 
organizations and management. The study investigated four selected Dutch firms in Thailand 
using evidences collected through observations and open-ended interviews. All evidences 
were analysed under grounded theory procedure. Parts of the evidences and theorization from 
the study are presented in this paper, which begins with two cultural riddles from one of the 
cases as a backdrop for subsequent discussions.  Following the riddles is an abridge version of 
the key finding of the study—a grounded theory of cross-cultural intelligence. Then the two 
riddles are revisited, this time to illustrate how the proposed theory could illuminate an 
understanding of their covert meanings vis-à-vis culture and learning in multinationals. Last, 
we reinstate how our study and its theoretical and empirical findings can elucidate the central 
thesis that multinationals are essentially multicultural units. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Academic and policy discourse on multinational corporations has been prolific in both 
economic and management communities with substantial interdisciplinary influences, notably 
of the former on the latter.  A side-effect of the dominance of economic thinking in the 
discourse on multinationals is a sore lack of attention on one fundamental element of 
multinational corporations, namely culture. 
 
Culture, although not entirely ignored in economics, has never been given a rigorous attention 
(DiMaggio, 1990; Fernández, 2008; Guiso et al., 2006). At best culture is included as a 
variable but stripped down to its reductive surrogates.  At worst, culture is set aside or put 
together with the residuals. Treatment of culture in economics, in brief, is still in elementary 
state. For this, management thinking may return the favour and inject an inspiring influence. 
This paper makes a case for the value of looking at culture and multinationals from a 
management and organizational perspective because it is one which could direct greater 
attention towards culture as a significant factor in future investigation on multinational 
corporations. This is because multinationals are fundamentally multicultural units in more 
ways than one, as we attempt to illustrate in this paper. Culture permeates many aspects of a 
multinational and to ignore, put aside, or downplay its role may render our understanding of 
multinational corporations inexcusably simplistic and critically incomplete. 
 
This paper is based on selected materials from a qualitative study of culture and learning in 
organizations and management (Kwanjai, Forthcoming). The study investigated four selected 
Dutch firms in Thailand using evidences collected through observations and open-ended 
interviews. All evidences were analysed under grounded theory procedure (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and the 
theorising effort yielded four extensive cases. A grounded theory of cultural intelligence, by 
the name of ‘cross-cultural intelligence amidst webs of cultures,’ became the key outcome of 
the study. 
 
The paper begins with two cultural riddles from one of the cases in the study as a backdrop 
for subsequent discussions.  Following the riddles is an abridge version of the key finding of 
the study—the aforementioned grounded theory of cross-cultural intelligence. Then the two 
riddles are revisited, this time to illustrate how the proposed theory could illuminate an 
understanding of their covert meanings vis-à-vis culture and learning in multinationals. Last, 
we reinstate how our study and its theoretical and empirical findings can elucidate the central 
thesis that multinationals are essentially multicultural units. 
 
 
2. Cultural riddles of deadline and mistake 
 
ADT2 is a Dutch company founded in the early 1980’s by five engineering graduates of a 
well-known Dutch university, with an initial focus solely on design and development of data 
communication technologies. Until its entry into Thailand around 1997, the company 
outsourced all its production needs to third parties and concentrated mainly on its core 
competency in design and development. 
 
                                                 
2 For anonymity, company and character names were replaced with fictitious ones. The stories, however, were 
based on real incidents and factual details were kept as accurate as possible. 
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ADT’s fully-owned subsidiary in Thailand came about as a by-product of an acquisition in 
1997 of a local company to gain entry into retail market in Asia, where the acquired company 
already had a substantial market base. The acquired company came with a skeleton 
production plant in Rayong, Thailand, which ADT was initially not at all keen on keeping 
since its production so far had entirely been outsourced successfully. However, the Asian 
financial crisis and the resulting drastic devaluation of the Thai Bath that occurred at the same 
time as the acquisition made it incidentally very cost-effective to develop the plant. ADT 
decided to invest in the factory and experiment with having its own production. 
 
As it turned out, ADT discovered that having its own production facility in-house carried 
many advantages, particularly the possibility for activities which could not be done via 
outsourcing, such as experimenting with new concepts, producing small specialised series or 
prototype products, and the like. Thus, by 2006, ADT’s subsidiary in Thailand had developed 
to be the only in-house production facility of the budding multinational. Its operation was 
under the management of a Dutch Managing Director (MD), Khun Pim Kempster3, who was 
transferred from the headquarters. The MD has had a long history as a member of ADT top 
executives and was seen as someone who could provide the best channel to transfer corporate 
missions and management directives from the headquarters to the Thai subsidiary. He 
managed a team of about seven high-level technicians, all Thais, who were in charge of the 
factory operation that had about 100 local employees. Among the senior Thai staffs, Khun 
Maleewan Manasakul, a Thai female engineer, who was in charge of Production/Human 
Resource Management (HRM), was one who maintained the most interaction with Khun Pim 
and other senior Dutch executives. 
 
Two other Dutch executives from the headquarters were in constant contact with the Thai 
plant. First, Corporate Vice President (VP) of Sales & Marketing, Khun Joeri van Emmen, 
also handled sales and marketing in Thailand. Next, ADT top executive the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Khun Kees van Dyke, kept a close eye on the Thai operations through 
constant communication with Khun Pim and Khun Joeri. He also paid regular visits to 
Thailand to oversee vital financial and management matters. 
 
Khun Pim, the MD, was rather impressed with the Thai’s willingness to serve and the 
different manner of daily living he met with as a high-ranked expatriate executive in Thailand. 
He gradually developed a deep affection for the Thai staffs at the plant. They were willing to 
serve, humble in their manner, yet strangely dignified. The ‘dignified’ humility was also 
appreciated by Khun Kees, the CEO, who found it to be a refreshing change from the overt 
brown-nosing manner he observed in some other countries he had been to. Yet, at times, the 
readiness to serve, or rather the eagerness to please, could create a strange tension. 
 
2.1 Deadline: dead or alive? 
 
Take the routine case of setting up delivery schedule, for example. Khun Joeri always 
presented himself to the Thai plant as their ‘biggest’ customer. In a typical Dutch tradition, 
Khun Joeri believed that he only needed to make his wishes clear and then there should be no 
question about the delivery to fulfil those wishes. As a Production Manager/HRM, Khun 
Maleewan was directly responsible for scheduling the resources, physical as well as human, 
                                                 
3 To give local flavour to the narration, all characters are addressed in Thai style as it was in real life, with the 
Thai “Khun” which is equivalent to Mr. or Mrs. in English, followed by the first name, except when first 
introduced. Character job titles follow what they were in real life. 
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so that production could be done to meet delivery requirements, vis-à-vis quantity, quality, 
and time. 
 
ADT itself served a customer-base that was very demanding and competed in a computerised 
technology market which changed so rapidly that stockpiling was not a viable solution. Put 
simply, the clients wanted the right products, at the right time, with the right quality. What 
this meant to Khun Joeri was that once a commitment was made for a delivery, it had to be 
delivered as and when committed. Delivery schedule for Khun Joeri was thus a deadline with 
the emphasis on dead. Khun Maleewan knew this of course and always tried to set production 
schedule so that it matched with Khun Joeri’s expectation. For the factory, however, that 
commitment could be no more than a delivery schedule—as in intended date of completion, 
or a point of reference. Khun Pim on his part, could only trust that Khun Maleewan and her 
team would try their very best to keep to that point of reference. 
 
Unfortunately, oftentimes, things did not go as scheduled and the delivery dates had to be 
rescheduled—sometimes more than once. At the factory, this was a matter of working harder 
to meet the new point of reference. But for Khun Joeri this could spell disaster. He needed to 
deal with anxious or, more often than not, disgruntling customers worldwide, since the Thai 
subsidiary had become ADT’s main production facility. He might even need to take costly 
action to keep the deadline alive, such as having the shipment delivered by expensive air 
cargo across continents instead of cheaper sea freight. This dented the profit margin and did 
not reflect well on Sales & Marketing. As it was, Khun Joeri and Khun Kees, the CEO, faced 
pressure from the clients everywhere and everyday to deliver on schedule. How could this 
pressure be felt just as acutely at the Thai factory, just so delivery schedule would translate 
into delivery deadline to them? 
 
Khun Pim had experienced that kind of pressure before and so he certainly knew how it felt. 
Yet, everyday, he also witnessed how hard his staffs tried to serve and he learned that putting 
pressure was not really the Thai way of getting results. Khun Maleewan also felt the pressure. 
She knew when Khun Joeri, who was as blunt as blunt could be, said he wanted things 
delivered, it must be delivered and she tried her best to keep to the estimates. Still, she could 
only push the factory so far. The production was these people’s jobs, yes, but it was not their 
lives. She knew that in Thailand people worked to live, not vice versa. She wished the 
schedules could be a tad more flexible as reference points, rather than deadlines that the 
Dutch made them out to be. 
 
How could everyone be served and pleased at the same time? How could the delivery 
deadline and schedule be synchronized? 
 
 
2.2 Mistake: three strikes and you’re out? 
 
Murphy’s Law governed the ADT factory once in a while. That was to be expected. Nobody 
at ADT had the unrealistic expectation that mistakes would not be made. Still, mistakes could 
bring on complications that were beyond their simple direct consequences. The question was: 
how should one deal with mistakes? 
 
ADT had a strict policy that Sales & Marketing Department must be the only focal point of all 
communications with clients. This code of conduct was the key to keep ADT’s tactical and 
strategic responses to market as solidified and competitive as possible. Khun Joeri, VP Sales 
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& Marketing, took this to be not only his main responsibility but also his crucial marketing 
tactic. He did not really mind dealing with the clients’ concerns. It did not matter where in the 
company the concerns were related to, be it design and development, production, or after sale 
support. To deal with clients’ requests and complaints was after all part of Khun Joeri’s job. 
The information he got from such dealings could be used to improve future operation. In 
some cases, He could even use the situations to leverage his negotiation with the clients. If a 
client had any issue with ADT’s products or services, Khun Joeri and his team were there to 
deal with it. All in a day’s work. 
 
But the clients sometimes did not really care to observe ADT internal code of conduct, like in 
the case of a Singaporean client who took it to himself to approach the factory directly 
regarding dissatisfaction with a particular shipment. To the client, this was the shortest route 
to having his concern addressed. The Thai staffs at the factory who received the complaint 
were very embarrassed and anxious. They knew that they should tell the client to go to Khun 
Joeri but they suspected that the client was reluctant to do so for a combination of reasons. 
The client was in Asia and it was more convenient to contact the Thai factory than the Dutch 
office. All that the client wanted was a direct, instant response he could get with a face-to-face 
meeting or simple phone call, without having to bother with time-zone difference or delayed 
e-mail communication. Moreover, most local clients preferred to deal with their local 
counterparts. To most Asians, it could be quite uncomfortable to approach and deal with the 
Dutch who were too far away and often too direct for them to cope with.  To the Thai staffs, it 
was their obligation to please the client and rectify the shameful situation that arose out of 
their domain. They did not feel comfortable even to refer the problem to Khun Pim, the MD. 
In the end they tried their best to satisfy the client’s request exactly as asked. After all, such 
direct dealings were not uncommon in most Thai business operations. Why involved Sales & 
Marketing when it was actually the factory’s fault? All’s well that ends well. 
 
Until Khun Joeri found out what happened. This made his job incredibly difficult. The factory 
was thus given a clear warning—a written announcement from the top boss, Khun Kees, the 
CEO, who was not amused with the incident either. ‘Please next time, if and when the factory 
get any request from a client, whoever that is, refer the customer to Sales & Marketing and do 
nothing else whatsoever until you hear from your biggest customer—VP of Sales & 
Marketing.’ End of Act One. 
 
Act Two: a similar request from another local Asian client was addressed to the Thai plant. 
This followed again by a similar arrangement between the client and the Thai staffs. Another 
very stern warning was issued and made clear to all parties. This time it was specifically 
stated that whoever disobeyed this policy again would be simply asked to take leave. Three 
strikes and you’re out. End of Act Two. 
 
Khun Pim was not happy for Act Three to ever come about; he would feel greatly 
uncomfortable if he had to fire any of his Thai staffs. He knew it was a common practice back 
in the Netherlands for such a reprimand to be issued and take effect. Yet he felt ill at ease 
seeing that stern treatment applied to the Thai staffs, whom he now considered ‘his people.’ 
Although he realized they had repeatedly violated an important code of conduct, he also 
believed they were trying their best with the best intention and might not take the reprimand 
as it was intended by the headquarters.  Khun Kees, the CEO, knew of course that the mistake 
was done with the best intention, which made it even more difficult for him, because the best 
intention did not translate into the best practice in this case. Something needed to be done to 
ensure that the best intention would equate the best practice. 
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The intriguing questions remained. How could the best intention result in such unintended 
tension? Why was it that, for the same incident, the Thai focussed purely on the mistake at the 
production line as a shame to be rectified with honour while the Dutch were more concerned 
with the guilty disciplinary violation and its consequences? How could the best intention be 
aligned with the best practice? What exactly was the mistake, and was it a shame or guilt? 
 
Before we attempt to decipher these two cultural riddles, a roadmap to the analysis must first 
be drawn. 
 
3. A grounded theory of cultural intelligence 
 
Culture is a concept that defies a unanimous definition. Numerous conceptualizations of 
culture span several decades and disciplines since its inauguration in anthropology in the 
1960’s (Adler, 2002; Boyacigiller et al., 2004; Geertz, 1993; Groseschl and Doherty, 2000; 
Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Inglehart et al., 2004; Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1963; 
Leung and Bond, 2004; Sackmann, 1991; Schneider and Barsoux, 2003; Schwartz and Sagiv, 
1995; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998). The conceptualization of culture in our 
grounded theory resonates with what previously put forward by Geertz (1993) and stands as 
yet one more variant for the meaning of culture. What emerged as the locus of culture in our 
theorizing are the sense-making process and the meanings that are the results of that process. 
Culture, under this locus, is thus a web of shared meanings that underlies two basic processes 
in social interaction: 1) cognitive process, which comprises sense-making and interpretation 
of all that a person encounters, be that material objects, social behaviours, or mental concepts, 
and 2) behavioural process, which comprises action, inaction and interaction, based on 
meanings given to the objects of that action, inaction or interaction. To wit, culture is a shared 
way of being and sense-making that is unique to a distinct group of people and can distinguish 
that group from others. 
 
3.1 A cultural onion model 
 
The cultural onion model is a widely accepted conceptualization of the internal dynamics of 
culture (Adler, 2002; Hofstede, 2001; Schneider and Barsoux, 2003). Although there are as 
many variations of the cultural onion as there are cultural theorists, all variants of the model, 
including ours, share the following fundamental implications. Culture manifests itself in 
diverse ways, shapes and forms, ranging from the most visible to the least fathomable. These 
many diverse manifestations of culture can be likened to the many layers of an onion. The 
outer layers are the more easily seen and comprehended components of culture, such as 
material objects, costumes, verbal and non-verbal languages, or architecture. The inner layers 
are the less visible facets, such as institutions or cognitive attributes. Most theorists would go 
on to state that these layers are all related to one another in a particular fashion. The most 
frequently theorised relation, again ours included, is that the inner layers are the ones that 
influence the outer layers, and the innermost, namely the cultural core, bears significant 
illumination to all cultural influences. Figure 1 below is a summary depiction of the particular 
cultural onion model theorised for the grounded theory in this study. 
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Figure 1: A cultural onion model 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ theorization 
 
3.2 Cross-cultural intelligence amidst webs of cultures  
 
A grounded theory of cross-cultural intelligence amidst webs of cultures4 is a theory of how a 
cultural unit (such as a person, group, organization, nation, and so on) operates in a cross-
cultural platform and as such could aid in analysis of cross-cultural phenomena. 
 
The key property of any cultural unit is its cultural identity which comprises dynamic webs of 
cultures. A cultural unit, even an individual, usually belongs to or is made up of multiple 
cultures. The property of a cultural unit can thus be depicted as a cluster of many cultural 
onions. Most, if not all, cultural units will have many overlapping and oftentimes conflicting 
cultural layers from many cultural onions, thereby forming webs of cultures. 
 
When a cultural unit operates in a cross-cultural platform, it then must function also amidst 
other webs of cultures. By definition, cross-cultural platform itself is also a cultural unit, with 
its own webs of cultures in force since cross-cultural platform designates a social condition 
that comprises people from at least two distinct cultures. As such, any real world cross-
cultural interaction is intractably complex, because it invariably involves multitude of 
competing meanings which are constantly in flux. To cope in such intractably, non-
deterministic situation, a cultural unit has to exercise what we theorized as cross-cultural 
intelligence—the ability to manoeuvre the cultural webs effectively. 
 
The complexity of webs of cultures calls for a specific strategy for which we coined the term 
‘cross-cultural heuristic.’ Cross-cultural heuristic is the heart of cross-cultural intelligence—a 
                                                 
4 The concept of cross-cultural intelligence (with the emphasis on ‘cross’) as developed in our theory bears a 
subtle, yet significant, distinction and relationship to a recently established concept of cultural intelligence (Ng 
and Earley, 2006; Thomas and Inkson, 2003; Triandis, 2006). Broadly speaking, the former is a specific subset 
of the latter. Please refer to Kwanjai and den Hertog (2008) for further details on this issue. 
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simple strategy to deal with complex situation.  By heuristic is meant a set of simple ‘rules of 
thumb’ which may not guaranteed optimal or even successful outcomes but promises possible 
satisfactory results at reasonable cost. Cross-cultural heuristic that has emerged in this study 
comprises a specific set of steps and tactics and is discussed in details elsewhere (Kwanjai 
and den Hertog, Work-in-progress). 
 
4. Understanding the cultural riddles of deadline and mistake 
 
4.1 The case as a cultural unit 
 
The study and its theorizing centred on what transpired in the cases. Hence, the very central 
unit of analysis was a case, which was fundamentally a unique set of ‘webs of cultures’ in 
itself. Each of the cases in this study was a particular group of Dutch and Thai employees who 
worked together on a regular basis to serve a Dutch multinational that has an operation in 
Thailand. In each case, there exist many webs of cultures, with multitude of competing 
meanings. 
 
For the cases in this study, it was the crossing of two distinct cultural units of the same 
level—national, that was the primary cross-cultural context: the crossing of Dutch and Thai 
cultures. This particular crossing of cultures thus became the exact spot where the theoretical 
lens zoomed in to expound upon. This section explores the underlying webs of meanings in 
these two cultures and identifies the potential competing meanings when the two cultures 
come into contact with each other. 
 
4.2 Core meanings: Dutch and Thai 
 
Based on the cultural onion model in Figure 1, Table 1 below summarises core meanings in 
the Dutch and Thai cultures as emerged from our study. Even at cursory glance, the 
contending nature of the two sets of meanings is interestingly evident. Not only do the two 
sets of meanings differ, they differ in quite a contending fashion. This is the first signal that 
the undercurrent of the two contending national cultures has a high potential to exert 
consequential influences, because it provides a rich ground for competing meanings. 
 
4.2.1 The meaning of ‘self’ 
 
First is the meaning of self, or in other words, the meaning of one’s existence. In the Dutch 
culture, this is defined primarily by the individual him- or herself, meaning you are what you 
make of yourself. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands scored very high in Hofstede’s 
individualism index—with an index of 80 and a rank way at the top 4-5, on par with Canada 
and only surpassed by the US, Australia and Great Britain (Hofstede, 2001: 500). Yet, the 
Dutch’s view of self has its unique quality, in line with what has been theorised to be a major 
common Dutch trait: egalitarianism (van der Horst, 1996). As van der Horst inferred, the 
Dutch version of egalitarianism had its particular flavour, “[i]t advocates cultural individuality 
but not personal egoism” (van der Horst, 1996: 57). For the Dutch, the meaning of oneself is 
first and foremost a responsibility before it can turn into a right or privilege. You are 
responsible for your own significance but that does not mean that you are the only one that 
matters. Everybody is subject to this one responsibility and that is what makes for equality. 
You have to earn your meaning, in the Dutch eyes; you are not simply born deserving it. To 
repeat, you are what you make of yourself. 
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Table 1: Core meanings, Dutch and Thai cultures 
 
Meaning of … DUTCH THAI 
self is defined primarily by self. 
Æ You are what you make of yourself. 
is defined primarily by others. 
Æ You are what people make of you. 
others is defined by their acts in a situation, in 
relation to what contributions those acts 
make. 
is defined by their roles in a situation, in 
relation to how they fulfil those roles. 
environment is a given, to be explored and exploited. 
Nature: is functional and manageable. 
Time: is valuable and must be used 
efficiently. 
Space: is scarce and must be used 
efficiently. 
is a gift, to be thankful for and revered. 
Nature: is sacred and animate. 
Time: is a point of reference. 
 
Space: is sacred as it is part of nature. 
(inter)relationship is defined by relative contributions to a 
situation. 
is defined by relative roles in a 
situation. 
 
Source: Authors’ theorization 
 
The Thai, by contrast, tend to define the meaning of themselves based primarily on how they 
think other people make of their existence. It is not that they do not take their own ideas of 
themselves into account. They do, but only after and in relation to what they deem to be the 
ideas other people have of them. Not surprisingly, Thailand scored in the opposite direction to 
the Netherlands in Hofstede’s individualism index—an index of 20 and ranked way towards 
the bottom half at 39-41. Many analyses of the Thai culture indeed unanimously classified it 
as a ‘collectivist’ society, where collective thinking exerts decisive forces on individuals 
(Atmiyanandana and Lawler, 2004; Holmes and Tangtongtavy, 1997; Komin, 1991; Mulder, 
2000; Redmond, 2002). Komin’s interpretation of the Thai ego-orientation described exactly 
how the Thai ego was shaped in a collectively oriented way, because by ‘ego oriented’ she 
meant highly conscious of self-image (Komin, 1991). As such, for the Thai, self or ego is 
what is out there in the open, defined and revealed by how others treat and define you. You 
are what people make of you, in a nutshell. 
 
Holmes & Tangtongtavy gave an insightful view of how the Thai would behave based on 
other people’s view. They theorised on the exact nature of ‘others’ that the Thai take into 
account under the framework of ‘the three circles of Thailand’ (Holmes and Tangtongtavy, 
1997: 39-44), which basically classified the three spheres of social circles from the most 
intimate one—the family circle, to the non-family but important one—the cautious circle, to 
the negligible one—the selfish circle. They elaborated on how Thais would behave differently 
when operated in each of these circles. Their observation sheds interesting lights on how the 
Thai define the meaning of themselves. How a typical Thai takes into account what other 
people think of him- or herself, depends very much on from which of these circles those 
others belong to. How a family member, which also includes someone you consider as 
virtually your family, makes of you is meaningful but can be taken for granted. Those others 
from the cautious circle, however, are ones whose notion of you must be cautiously cultivated 
and harvested. These are the people you interact with on a social or formal basis, at work, 
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social functions, and so on. How the views of these others would contribute to the meaning of 
your existence, in turn, depends on who they are, to you. How your boss sees you, for 
example, would contribute greatly to who you are at work. If he or she thinks well of you, 
then you are significant in your work function. The same can be said of your teachers, friends, 
colleagues and so on. Finally, the negligible others are those from the selfish circle, the circle 
where you can totally define your own ego without paying much attention to the views of 
these insignificant others. These are people who have no lasting influences on your life and as 
such, how they make of you have no influence on the meaning of your existence in the Thai’s 
view. 
 
4.2.2 The meaning of ‘others’ 
 
The meanings of others in the Dutch and Thai cultures are logically related to the meanings of 
self. Generally, how the Dutch and Thai give meanings to others is a kind of mirror images of 
how they give meanings to themselves, although the process has its own slant and emphasis.  
 
The Dutch define the meanings of others by their acts in a situation and in relation to what 
contributions those acts make to the situation. In a way, this is also rooted in the egalitarian 
spirit of the Dutch culture—each person is judged based on how he or she is and acts, 
individually. It also relates very much to the Dutch utilitarianism as identified by van der 
Horst (1996). For a Dutch, those whose acts contribute positively to a situation are one whose 
existence bears valuable meaning. The opposite is of course true when their acts contribute 
negatively to a situation. Thus the Dutch take people based on what they do and the 
contributions they make. 
 
The Thai, on the other hand, are first and foremost concerned with what role a person has and 
how he or she fulfils that role. The meaning of other people is first defined by looking at who 
they are in a situation. The role of each person in a situation has first to be established before 
one knows how to address and interact with every individual one meets. There is, however, 
more than a simple rule of hierarchy in the Thai webs of meanings. Again, the framework of 
the three circles of Thailand provides an elucidation. The Thai see meanings in others, first 
and foremost, based on which circle those others belong to. Within each circle, there are a set 
of roles, each of which has its own specific rank, status, behaviour, contribution, and so on, or 
in brief, the total meaning of a person in that role. What role a person takes in a particular 
situation is then based on a combination of diverse factors—initial birth condition, age, 
gender, education, social status, achievement, responsibility, task, and so forth. 
 
Once roles are established in a situation, the Thai would then see others based on how they 
fulfil their particular roles. Certain expectations of character and behaviour are always 
associated with each role. In general, the higher in rank a role is, the more superior quality is 
expected. Role definition is then set against role fulfilling, and when the two do not correlate 
in a person, the meaning of that person diminishes significantly. In the work place, for 
example, a boss is expected to be superior in all aspects of character and behaviour. He or she 
is supposed to know best, act kindly but decisively, make good decisions, lead with 
confidence, take responsibility, be morally and ethically sound and so forth. If a boss does not 
fulfil these expectations, a Thai subordinate tends to think less of him or her. A subordinate, 
by comparison, has a different set of expectations to fulfil. In general, a subordinate does not 
need to know best but must follow order well and be loyal to the boss without a speck of 
doubt. Loyalty usually implies defending the boss’s honour, or face, as if it were one’s own. 
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4.2.3 The meaning of ‘environment’ 
 
The Dutch and the Thai look at the environment, again, in a starkly contending way. For the 
Dutch, the environment is simply a ‘given’ whose value must be explored and exploited. By 
explore is meant a practical survey to evaluate the situation and by exploit is meant to make 
the best possible use of what is given. This applies to all aspects of environment. Thus to the 
Dutch, natural environment serves a functional purpose and must be managed to the best of its 
potential. The famous Dutch dykes and other ingenious ways to make use of land and water 
are testimonials to this spirit and often used to characterise the Dutch utilitarian view of their 
physical environment (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993; van der Horst, 1996). The 
Dutch treat abstract environment in the same fashion. Time and space are truly scarce 
resources to the Dutch, serve functional purposes, and must be managed and used efficiently. 
Punctuality is a virtue in the Dutch culture because time is precious and must be well 
observed. The ‘deadline’ episode at ADT is a classic illustration of how the Dutch view time, 
and how that view can cross with meaning of time in other cultures, as will be duly elaborated 
on. 
 
The Thai, by contrast, take environment as a gift, to be thankful for and revered. Natural 
environment is deemed sacred and animate; there are gods for all various natural artefacts—
rivers, mountains, valleys, forests, rain, drought, the sun, moon, star, sky, and so on. 
Countless rituals are associated with how the Thai look at natural environments not as 
physical objects but animated entities. Abstract environment is regarded by the Thai in a 
similar fashion. Time is regarded as a part of life, it is a mere point of reference and its 
meaning is relative. As Klausner observed: ‘the Thai are adverse to being slaves to the clock’ 
(Klausner, 1993: 334). Time, in other words, is part of what transpire, and not a dictate of 
them. In fact, the Thai tend to regard haste as something that could lead to undesirable results, 
such as mistakes and accidents. No wonder, at ADT deadlines for the Thai employees were 
neither definite nor critical; they were mainly points of reference. As for space, the Thai 
regarded this as part of nature and so their view of space is similar to how they view natural 
environment. The Thai concept of space is very similar to the Chinese concept of ‘feng shui’ 
even though they do not subscribe to meticulous practices as do the Chinese. 
 
4.2.4 The meaning of ‘(inter)relationship’ 
 
The meanings of (inter)relationship in the Dutch and the Thai cultures follow fairly 
straightforwardly from how they view self, others and environment. Put simply, for the 
Dutch, (inter)relationship between and among those three basic entities are based primarily on 
the relative contributions of each of those entities to a situation. The Thai, however, define 
(inter)relationship first and foremost based on the relative roles of those entities and how the 
roles are fulfilled. Since relationship and interrelationship are diverse and situational 
dependent, the discussion on this issue can only be kept at a broad level unless given specific 
contextual references. 
 
 
4.3 Interpreting the cultural riddles 
 
The above set of potentially contending core meanings in the Dutch and the Thai cultures 
gives rise to great possibilities that the two cultures will give meanings to many concepts, 
entities or acts, not just in different manners but more so in a divergent fashion and hence 
most likely to bear significant force in the crossing of the two cultures. It must be pointed out 
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that the term ‘significant force’ emphasizes only the issue of strength and does not carry with 
it any judgmental insinuation. It suggests simply that the starkly contending meanings have a 
great potential to define the nature of the crossing of these two cultures, but does not claim to 
predict any specific property of that nature—good or bad, positive or negative. Opposites can 
attract as well as repel, and that is exactly the case with cross-cultural cultural contention. 
 
4.3.1 Deadline: dead or alive? 
 
The riddle on delivery schedule v. delivery deadline is a web of contending meanings at many 
levels. At the very core are the contending meanings of time. For the Dutch, time is precious 
and schedule is a sacred contract; for the Thai, time should not be allowed to dictate but only 
to provide a point of reference. As such, for the Dutch, particularly Khun Joeri, the VP of 
Sales & Marketing, delivery timetable was a guarantee of commitment. It designated what he 
guaranteed to delivery to customers, which equated to what the production line guaranteed to 
deliver to him. It was a deadline, meaning failure to fulfil this commitment would result in a 
fatal consequence. In the Thai culture, as time is usually seen as something one should take 
command of and not be subject to, Thais tend not take appointment too seriously. It is only a 
point of reference, something that you set up so you have an idea of your target. Not meeting 
an appointment means no more than that either the target is wrongly set or something else 
happens that has not been included in the estimation. That means a new target can be set and 
life goes on, no fatality needed. 
 
The deadline episode also illustrates influences of a few other contending meanings: 
valuation, lifestyle, work and play, and privacy. For brevity’s sake these manifestations are 
not elaborated further. 
 
4.3.2 Mistake: guilt or shame? 
 
The episode concerning mistake at ADT provides a good illustration of how the Thai and the 
Dutch see mistake so differently in many aspects. Fundamentally, it illustrates how the 
different ways the Dutch and Thai give meaning to themselves could influence their views of 
mistake. For the Thai employees, the company and their bosses were ‘family’ and the mistake 
was seen as a loss of face to the outer cautious circle, the client, whom they needed to be most 
careful with. Their reasoning could be as follows. The customers must always think well of 
you and your boss, else you would lose your face, and your business. How the bosses thought 
of you and how you acted in this case was an internal affair that could be easily resolved 
within the family. Thus, it was more important to take quick action to remedy the customer’s 
negative view. More, this interpretation also brings out the complexity of ‘webs of cultures’ 
since it illustrates how there can be no deterministic rule of when a particular cultural force 
will be the trigger of a particular action. In this case, the force of the familial role as part of 
the company was stronger than the force of the role as an obedient employee, because Thais 
are most concerned with face when dealing with the cautious circle. The boss was part of the 
family circle, whose collective face was preeminent to any violation of internal agreement. 
 
Then, there were at least two other aspects to the meanings of mistake: what mistake signifies 
v. what is identified as a mistake. The Thai tend to look at mistake with apprehension. This 
has to do with the abhorrence of losing face. To most typical Thais, it is very important to be 
perceived well by the two important circles of others in the community, particularly the 
cautious circle. And to be perceived well is achieved mostly by fronting respectable, flawless 
appearances, reinforced by the eagerness to please others. In reverse, anything that signifies a 
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weakness, failure or inferiority is to be avoided, covered up, or readily rectified. Mistake 
signifies negative quality and is a cause for shame. While Thais are shameful of mistake, the 
Dutch tend to take it simply as a sign of inefficiency or incorrect choice. To a typical Dutch, 
one learns from one’s mistake and moves on. To learn from mistake, one first needs to 
acknowledge it, or have it pointed out in the face. As such, to make the same mistake 
repeatedly in the Dutch eyes is a sign of either inexcusable ignorance or misguided 
stubbornness. 
 
The above interpretation may explain partly why the Thai staffs acted the way they did when 
confronted with a client’s complaint, and why the Dutch were not amused at the repeated 
violation of the company policy. It may also explain why there was a mismatch of 
identification of what exactly was ‘the’ mistake. The Thai factory felt responsible for having 
delivered ‘bad’ products and at the same time when confronted by the client, identified 
themselves as part of the company. They must have felt doubly shameful: at having produced 
bad products and embarrassed on behalf of the company. While the Thai looked externally, 
the Dutch were more concerned with the internal implication of the mistake. Khun Kees and 
Khun Joeri were much less concerned with the defect in shipment than with the outright 
violation of the company’s key policy. To them as executives, the consequences of the 
production mistake were at operational level, while violation of code of conduct struck at 
company’s strategic and tactical cord. The incident thus illustrated a rather tangled web of 
mismatched meanings of mistake. 
 
4.4 So what? 
 
It must be emphasized that the above analyses are but our interpretations of the story. We do 
not claim to deliver the impossible task of having a complete or absolute understanding of it. 
Our intention is to illustrate how the webs of meanings based on cultural interpretation could 
give plausible explanation to what can influence people to act the way they do in real world 
cross-cultural encounters. Also, it is not our intention to prescribe a cultural determinist view 
that culture is the only force in social phenomena. We intend to point out only that culture is 
one of the significant forces. What is important is not to see culture everywhere, but rather to 
see it where it matters.  
 
And that is when cross-cultural heuristic comes into play. So far we may have given an 
impression that the complexity of webs of cultures are beyond comprehension and solution or 
resolution. That is far from the case. We intentionally did not go beyond deciphering the 
possible competing meanings in the case. We did not conclude which meaning was most 
effective, because, as our study has revealed, such conclusion is highly situational and the key 
to find a solution or resolution to the complexity of cross-cultural condition and its multitudes 
of competing meanings lies in an understanding and practicing of the cross-cultural heuristic. 
This, however, is a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper and can be referred to 
elsewhere (Kwanjai and den Hertog, Work-in-progress). 
 
 
5. Culture and multinational corporations 
 
Under the view of the proposed grounded theory on cross-cultural intelligence, it can be 
argued why multinationals are multicultural units. By its definition, multinational 
corporations are cultural units made up of more than one cultures, that is, more than one 
‘national’ cultures, for starters. In most cases, there are more than one ‘national’ cultural 
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forces within multinationals, since they must function in a variety of cultural webs of 
international markets, employ employees from a variety of countries, work with supply-
chains from diverse nations, and so on so forth. More, ‘national’ culture is but one possible 
web within multinational corporations. As the concept of webs of cultures would suggest, 
multinational corporations, viewed from our proposed theory, are complex webs of cultures 
operating in yet other webs of cultures. It should not be difficult to imagine the many possible 
groups and layers of cultures—clique, team, department, profession and so on, that must be 
spinning their webs within one single multinational corporation. 
 
This is our simple assertion of a very complex issue that carries one key implication: 
multitude of cultural forces and their competing meanings form a potential influencing factor 
underlying multinational corporations. What happen with and within multinationals are 
essentially a form of cross-cultural interface in more ways than one. As such, a genuine 
understanding of the dynamics of these cultural forces, their competing meanings, and the 
cross-cultural interactions that they may be driving must be one of the indispensible insights 
needed in the study of multinational corporations. To date, as observed in the introduction, 
this has yet not been the case in the economic discourse of multinationals. It is hoped that the 
work on cross-cultural management, where culture has received a more rigorous attention 
during the past half century, together with the implications of the proposed theory, would 
inspire some in the economic community to put culture at the forefront of economic 
investigation of multinational corporations. A set of elementary observations on how this 
could develop serves as our conclusion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As culture has received relatively little attention in economic study of multinational 
corporations, the first challenge is to concentrate the effort on driving home the significance 
of culture in research on multinationals. A conviction that multinationals are multicultural 
units with complex webs of cultures as their cultural identity as well as their operating context 
may be one instrument in such effort. Theoretically, economics could benefit from the 
advances in the conceptualization of culture accomplished by the management community 
and make a jump start in further delving into relating culture to economic issues in 
multinationals. The question of how cultural dimensions relate to the many economic aspects 
of a multinational, such as growth, profit, mode of entry, or innovation, could be investigated 
based on the success of many management studies that relate culture to management topics. 
Last, and probably most importantly, economic study of multinational corporations could 
benefit from the crucial lesson learned in the management community regarding culture, 
namely, that this is one theme of research which demands diversity of views, methods, and 
cultures (Boyacigiller et al., 2004; Usunier, 1998). As such, it may be crucial for the 
economic community to include in their study of culture and multinationals paradigms of 
inquiry and methodologies that are not the mainstream in economics. For example, non-
positivist perspective and qualitative approach should be encouraged, a prospect that 
admittedly may not be easily accomplished given the established inclination in economic 
study. That may yet be the ultimate challenge for economic research that seek to investigate 
culture and multinationals. 
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